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A B S T R A C T
There have been calls for an overhaul of regulatory and governance frameworks to incorporate the
implications of the water-energy-food nexus. We map one small component of the regulatory space of
the nexus and highlight its immense complexity. We draw on insights from the economics and socio-
legal literatures to show that a decentralised approach to regulation based upon procedural justice can
enable the trade-offs of the nexus to be considered and addressed. We use a nexus case study of micro
hydro-electricity generation in Dartmoor National Park in England to show that when we take into
account interactions between state and non-state regulation, the economic concepts of interdependen-
cies and transaction costs, and a recognition that regulation of the nexus is a process involving decisions
of procedural justice, some existing regulatory frameworks are already well-equipped to deal with the
implications of nexus analysis.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locat e/e nvsci1 North (1990: 3) defines institutions as the ‘rules of the game in a society’, or
‘constraints that shape human interaction’. North sees institutions (or regulation) as
structuring the incentives associated with human exchange, whether it is political,
social, economic, or environmental.1. Introduction
From the water-energy-food nexus’ very early days some have
argued that the adoption of nexus analysis by policy makers will
require new regulatory and governance frameworks (Hoff, 2011).
For instance, Sharmina et al. (2016: 81) call for ‘a radical overhaul
of the current system of policy- and decision-making’ to avoid the
current practice of compartmentalised government policy and
regulation (see also Leck, 2015). While the form of the ‘radical
overhaul’ called for is not always spelled out, there is an implicit
(and sometimes explicit) expectation that current regulatory
frameworks should be replaced by centralised and technocratic
decision making processes that aim to draw on objective science
(e.g. Bazilian et al., 2011; Cairns and Krzywoszynska, 2016).
This paper provides a framework for thinking about how to
regulate the nexus and how to map the regulatory space of the
nexus. We conclude that while regulators have much to learn from
nexus analysis, in particular the identification and quantification of
interconnections and interdependencies, the nexus does not
require a radical overhaul of regulatory and governance frame-
works as some have suggested. Using micro hydro-electricity
generation on farmland in Dartmoor National Park in England as a
case study, we show that a regulatory framework built around the
principle of procedural justice and that recognises the concepts of* Corresponding author at: 19 Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EP, UK.
E-mail address: tav22@cam.ac.uk (T. van Gevelt).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.003
1462-9011/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articlinterdependence and transaction costs has the ability to generate
efficient outcomes and consider trade-offs among the sectors of
the nexus.
1.1. Regulation and its sources
In order to understand how to regulate the nexus, it is
important to consider what regulations are and where they come
from. At their most simple, regulations are constraints on
behaviour. These constraints consist of rules that often carry
sanctions for non-compliance.1 These rules can prohibit certain
actions (such as the dumping of animal waste in waterways) or
impose imperatives that require certain actions to be done (e.g.
requiring that planning permission is obtained before building a
hydro-electric power plant on your farm).2
The state is the most obvious source of regulation. It generates
regulation in almost every sphere of life; including the use and
production of water, energy, and food. In many societies, there are
multiple tiers of state regulation, including at the national/federal,2 In addition to regulation (that constrains behaviour) there are also governance
tools that aim to provide rewards/incentives to encourage certain behaviour. In
terms of the case study presented below, the most prominent would be agricultural
and renewable energy subsidies. This study focuses solely on the regulatory aspects
of the nexus.
e under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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international agreements and treaties that regulate the consump-
tion and production of water, energy, and food that are normally
enforced by nation states.
However, the state is not the only source of regulation. Ostrom
(1990) famously highlighted how non-state organisations (with
varying degrees of formality) regulate natural resources in a variety
of situations and societies. Ellickson (1994) has shown how the
cattle ranchers in California largely govern themselves using
informal rules (or social norms) that have been developed and are
enforced without the state or any other centralised authority.
Social norms can be enforced by other members of society who
adhere to the same norms; for instance, when a litterer or queue
jumper is rebuked by a member of society when a norm is broken.
However, many norms (and laws) are internalised by individuals.
In these instances, once a rule is internalised a psychological
penalty (e.g. guilt, shame) can apply to the act, which can regulate
the behaviour in question (Cooter, 1998; McAdams and Rasmusen,
2007). In addition to social norms, any individual that belongs to an
organisation, whether it be a farm, family, company, religious
group, club, university will be regulated by them. While many of
these may have little impact on water, energy, or food – many do.
For instance, some firms adhere to sustainability principles that
generate prohibitions and imperatives at the workplace in terms of
energy use, recycling, and waste disposal that go beyond state
regulation (Karassin and Bar-Haim, 2016). Many religious groups
impose imperatives and prohibitions that influence the consump-
tion and production of food (McCullough and Carter, 2013).3
In terms of how state and non-state regulations interact, they
may substitute or complement one another, or even generate
dissonance effects. In terms of complementarity, non-state
regulations may be in force in addition to state regulations.4 In
other cases, there may be no social regulation attached to a certain
activity, as it may be deemed to be morally neutral in a given
community, whereas such behaviour may be prohibited under the
state regulatory framework.5 The reverse can also be the case,
where a given behaviour is deemed to be wrong under the
prevailing social norms of a given community but state regulations
may not prohibit it.6 Indeed, there may even be cases where state
and non-state regulations push people in opposite directions,
generating legal or regulatory dissonance (Larcom, 2015).
There are many sources and forms of regulation and this can
result in a multi-layered regulatory environment for even the
simplest of activities. However, acknowledging this complexity is
necessary; otherwise a distorted or incomplete picture of the
regulatory environment will be generated. Combining this
regulatory complexity with the complexity of the nexus, which
explicitly aims to examine cross-sectoral interdependencies and
complexities itself, is a formidable task. Fig. 17provides a skeletal3 There is a vast literature on environmental regulation more generally and the
factors that affect real world behaviour. For an overview for instance see Percival
et al. (2013).
4 For example, farmers who are known to dump animal slurry in waterways may
be ostracised within farming communities and also face state regulations and
penalties.
5 One such example is that farming communities may be indifferent to tree
clearing to increase beef production, whereas strict state regulations may apply
(Seabrook et al., 2008).
6 For example, in some communities those who build and operate wind turbines
may face social sanctions due to concerns over loss of visual amenity, whereas they
may be free to do so under the state legislative framework.
7 Nexus relevant components of each of the nexus sectors is drawn from Bazilian
et al. (2011) and adapted by the authors. Note that this relates to direct regulation
and components, and does not include the effect of regulation on indirect drivers of
nexus resource use, including demographics, economic growth, and science and
technology.framework for mapping the regulatory framework of the nexus.
The-left-hand-side lists the different sources of regulation, broadly
categorised into state and non-state regulation. The right-hand-
side lists the main components of each of the sectors of the nexus.
As can be seen, there are 6 broad sources of regulation and 45 broad
components within the three nexus sectors, of water, energy and
food. While it will depend on the number of sources of regulation
and number of regulations from each source for each specific
component of the nexus, it can be seen that understanding the
regulatory environment of the nexus is a complex task. Indeed, if
each of the 6 sources of regulation had 10 individual regulations for
each of the 45 broad components (a very conservative estimate),
there would be 2700 individual regulations to consider. This
demonstrates that regulation of the nexus is an incredibly complex
task, and increases the complexity of nexus analysis by many
magnitudes.
1.2. Procedural justice, interdependencies, and transaction costs
As Fig. 1 suggests, even for one component of one of the sectors
of the nexus there are a multitude of regulations from multiple
sources, and many of these regulations and their sources are place
and activity specific. This raises an important question in terms of
the nexus: how can we map and design a regulatory framework to
account for all of the interactions and interdependencies of the
nexus? The complexity of regulation surrounding each component
of the nexus combined with the complexity of the nexus itself
would seem to make it a formidable task. Despite the complexity
involved, we argue that policymakers and regulators already have
the tools at their disposal to account for the interdependencies and
complexities that are highlighted by the nexus. In particular, we
argue that a regulatory framework built around the principle of
procedural justice and that recognises the economic concepts of
interdependencies and transaction costs has the ability to generate
outcomes that allocate resources in a broadly efficient manner, and
that enables the various trade-offs among the sectors of the nexus
to be considered. Before embarking on our analysis, we briefly
define each of these three concepts and their relevance to nexus
analysis in order to make them readily identifiable when we
present our case study.
At its most basic, procedural justice is a decision making
process that is recognised as being fair, where stakeholders can
participate in the process and where their values and preferences
are recognised (Schlosberg, 2009; Wood et al., 2016).8 As the
outcomes are likely to be more favourable to those who are
afforded participatory opportunities, if a broad spectrum of
stakeholders is able to meaningfully participate in the process
and have their values and preferences accounted for, procedural
justice has the ability to provide a path towards distributive justice
and efficient resource allocation.9
The concept of interdependence refers to a situation where the
choices of one agent influence the choices of another. Interde-
pendence leads to conflict when the choices of agents are
incompatible. By implication, resolving these conflicts necessi-
tates making a choice over which agent’s or agents’ interests are
prioritised and to what extent (Bromley, 1991; Adger et al., 2003).8 There are multiple models, ideas and definitions of procedural justice (e.g. see
Rawls, 1999).
9 Distributive justice helps understand which agent’s interests will be affected
and how they will be affected by establishing, changing or reaffirming regulation.
Procedural justice, with its focus on understanding which agents are able to
participate in the regulatory design process and the balance of power between
agents and regulators, can help justify decisions that may be difficult to achieve
from a purely distributive justice point of view (Paavola and Adger, 2005 and Sagoff,
2008).
Sources  of Regula on  
State 
Naonal  or Federal 
• Legislaon , Minist erial Regulaon , 
Direcves 
• Includes  sector specific regulaon and 
spaal  sp eci fic regulaon  (e.g.  Naonal 
Parks)   
State  or Pr ovince  
• As  above  (i f applica ble)  and depend s on 
constuon al division  of  responsibili es.   
Local 
• Local byelaw s and  direcv es.  
• Local government  re gula on  oen pla ys 
central  role in  food  wast e, wat er 
extracon , and  wast e wa ter.  
Internaonal Law  and  sup ranaonal  la w 
• Internaonal treaes  enacted  and  usually 
enforced th rough mun ici pal law 
Non-State 
Non-State Organisaons   
• Includes  organisaons  sp ecificall y 
designe d to  govern natura l resource  us e 
whi ch may have  stat e rec ognion  or not 
(e.g.  Dartm oor  Commoners’ Council  and 
non-state  el ders groups who govern 
resources in  Papua  Ne w Guinea) . 
• Compani es, firms , clubs, soci ees, 
religious  groups  that are  not  speci ficall y 
designe d to  govern natura l resources  bu t 
can impose regulaons  that  have  a direct 
effect  on  sectors of  th e nexus.  
Social Norm s 
• Social norms (or rules)  can include society 
wide no rms that can  aff ect  nexus  sectors 
(e.g. recycling,  plasc ba g use, water 
polluon) or  sub-group  social  norms (e.g. 
rules co ncer ning  appropriate  us e of 
ferlizer am ong  farmer s).   
• Social norms can  be enforced  by othe r 
member s of  society (o r th e sub-gr oup) or 
internall y (b y feelings  of  guilt,  remorse, 
per sonal  sasfacon).    
Water  
Precipitaon, run-off, 
groundwater , desalinaon , 
cat chme nts, da ms and  storage,  
seepage,  rivers and  canals, 
groundwate r transport, 
distribuon, pumping, irrigaon, 
treatm ent,  human  consumpon, 
animal consumpon, inp ut to 
manufacturing, hydro-po wer 
wastewater,  polluon and 
sewag e.
+ 
Energy 
Producon by fuel  source  (fossil 
fuel, hydro, solar,  wind, 
geothermal),  fuel  processing, 
transmission and  distribu on, 
polluon, transport, ferl izer 
producon, waste,  emissions, size 
of house,  he ang,  air-
condioning, and  household 
appliances . 
+ 
Food 
Primary  producon (b y ani mal 
and crop),  secondary   producon 
and ma nufacturing , biofuels, 
transportaon an d consumpon. 
Nexus Secto rs 
Fig. 1. Regulating the Nexus.
Source: adapted from Bazilian et al. (2011).
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is largely a function of agent attributes, these choices are often
codified as regulations. Regulation can therefore be seen to
generate both winners and losers in situations of interdepen-
dence. The concept of interdependence is important in under-
standing the regulation of the nexus for two main reasons. Firstly,
interdependence reasoning can suggest the scales at which
regulations should be enacted. For example, for complex
interdependence situations that span multiple sectors – such
as the nexus – it is likely that regulation operating at different
scales and enacted by different regulators will be required.
Secondly, an understanding of the concept helps us to see
regulation as a form of conflict resolution. This brings to the fore
the subjective nature of regulation and the centrality of
procedural justice in nexus regulatory decisions (Paavola and
Adger, 2005; Paavola, 2007).
In regulatory terms we can think of transaction costs as the cost
associated with collecting information necessary to inform,
formulate, monitor, co-ordinate, and enforce regulations(Eggertson, 1990). The existence of transaction costs means that
no regulation or regulatory environment can be perfectly designed
(Williamson, 2009). Acknowledging the existence of transaction
costs also means that sometimes it is optimal for an interdepen-
dence not to be corrected for – where the transaction costs
outweigh the benefits that could be generated by regulation. It also
means that it may be optimal for regulators with different
regulatory objectives, for example, those concerned with different
sectors of the nexus, not to perfectly co-ordinate their regulatory
activities. This is particularly relevant for the nexus, as regulation
covering multiple sectors and geographical scales is likely to
require the convening of a number of sources of regulation
operating at different scales thereby increasing transaction costs.
The extent to which transaction costs will impact on regulator co-
ordination will depend upon regulator attributes (including
expertise and capacity) as well as the resources in question
(including the degree of complexity). Taken together, including
transaction costs in the analysis of regulation may alter the
calculus and show that a regulatory situation that appears sub-
58 S. Larcom, T. van Gevelt / Environmental Science & Policy 72 (2017) 55–64optimal from a modelling perspective can be optimal in reality
(Paavola and Adger, 2005).
2. Materials and methods
In order to provide some concreteness toward mapping and
better understanding the regulatory environment of the nexus, we
drill down into the regulations for one of the 45 components of the
nexus listed above and focus on a given location: micro hydro-
electricity10 in Dartmoor, England.11 Micro hydro is seen as a key
contributor to national renewable energy policy by the Environ-
ment Agency (Environment Agency, 2010). Broadly speaking,
micro hydro is seen as the most benign of small-scale renewable
solutions but its operation can have a number of impacts on water
and food systems. For example, water is abstracted and diverted
through a turbine resulting in temporary depletion of the water
source. Some turbines may also alter water quality through
aerating the water. Construction of weirs may change water levels
and affect aquatic ecology dynamics. Resultant changes in water
flows can also alter the risk of flooding with possible implications
for agricultural production. Lastly, protected migratory fish species
(e.g. salmon) may swim into the turbines or get caught in the
tailrace (Devon Association for Renewable Energy, 2004).
We employ a regulatory mapping approach to provide concrete
details of the incentive structure and constraints that agents face
(e.g. Ostrom, 1990). We undertook our regulatory mapping in two
stages. First, we searched to identify regulations at different
geographic scales and from different sources. This involved a
search of legislation directly relevant to the nexus at the national
level and various levels of local government. We also searched for
sources of non-state regulation within the study site. In
undertaking the mapping exercise, we drew upon the relevant
academic literature to augment and cross-check our search
findings. Secondly, we analysed the official planning documents
held by the Dartmoor National Park Authority concerning the
establishment of a small micro hydro-electricity plant on the River
Walkham at Huckworthy Mill. This in-depth analysis allowed for
the regulatory process associated with micro hydro-electricity
generation in Dartmoor National Park to be understood.
2.1. Study site
Dartmoor consists of approximately 1000 square kilometres of
moorland in southern Devon, England. Much of Dartmoor is a
national park, and land use of the national park is as follows:
moorland grazing (47%), farmland (38%), woodlands (11%),
reservoirs (1%), human settlement/other (3%). In addition, 38%
of the national park is common land (see Fig. 2). The land within
national parks in England is not owned by the state. Within the
national park there are many private landowners, including the
Duchy of Cornwall (a private estate established in 1337 that
belongs to the Prince of Wales). There are approximately 34,000
people who live within the national park, with the largest
settlement being Ashburton with a population of 4000 people
(Dartmoor National Park Authority, 2016).
The moorlands within Dartmoor National Park are located at a
relatively high altitude and serve as the catchment area for many of
Devon’s rivers which have traditionally provided a power source.10 Micro hydro-electricity generation refers generally to hydro-electricity power
plants with a generation capacity of between 5 kW and 100 kW peak (Alstone et al.,
2015).
11 Dartmoor has been identified as an area with particular potential for economic
and environmental win-wins with regards to micro hydro-electricity generation
(Environment Agency, 2010).Archaeological evidence suggests that as far back as the 15th
century, tin mills used hydro power to power their waterwheels.
Monks from Buckfast Abbey powered their church in the early 20th
century using a small turbine, as did a number of farmers in the late
19th century. The 1920s and 1930s saw the application of more
ambitious hydro-electricity generation proposals, such as the Mary
Tavy hydro-electric power station which opened in 1932 (Hedges,
2002). As of 2016, there are currently 17 approved and operational
micro hydro-electricity plants12 and one pending application
within Dartmoor National Park (Dartmoor National Park Authority
pers. comm. 2016).
3. Results
As seen in Fig. 2, there are a number of sources and types of state
regulation that directly affect the nexus within Dartmoor. At the
national level, the UK government has designated certain places
within Dartmoor National Park as Sites of Special Scientific Interest
(SSSI) and certain areas adjacent or in close proximity to the
National Park as Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). Both
SSSI and AONB are subject to additional regulations administered
and enforced by Natural England. With statutory authority from
the national government, Dartmoor National Park is managed by
the Dartmoor National Park Authority and regulates a wide range
of activities with a focus on land and resource management within
its borders through its own byelaws. As also illustrated in Fig. 2,
Dartmoor falls into three local administrative units: West Devon,
Teighnbridge and South Hams and the Devon County Council who
regulate various activities at the borough and district level through
their own byelaws. At an administrative level below, there are 49
parish councils within Dartmoor National Park. Parish councils are
able to precept residents and have a number of miscellaneous
powers, as well as the ability to make byelaws in a limited number
of areas. While many of these byelaws do not have any direct
relevance to the nexus, many do, including resource use, waste,
and planning regulations. Furthermore, parish councils are
required to be notified of all planning applications and are entitled
to submit their comments to the planning authority which must be
taken into account when a decision is made.
As more than a third of Dartmoor National Park is common land
it is under the collective management of the Dartmoor Commoners
Council who regulates nexus activity through its own set of
regulations. There are also a number of non-state sources of
regulation that relate to the nexus in Dartmoor – these include
regulations from the Dartmoor Preservation Association, Dartmoor
Farmers Association, Duchy of Cornwall, rules of private organiza-
tions and prevailing norms among different social groups. Such
non-state sources can rely on a variety of mechanisms to enforce
their regulations, including contractual penalties, threats of
expulsion, and social sanctions.
3.1. Regulatory mapping for micro hydro-electricity generation in
Dartmoor
Fig. 3 presents the results of our regulatory mapping exercise
for micro hydro-electricity generation in Dartmoor. As can be seen,
there are national statutes that are directly relevant to the supply
of commercial hydro-electricity; including various electricity and12 A well-publicised example is Old Walls Farm located in Ponsworthy. The owners
of Old Walls Farm worked closely with the Environment Agency and Dartmoor
National Park Authority to design and build a 90 kW micro hydro-electricity plant to
provide an additional stream of income to farming by selling electricity to the
national grid. The project was notably supported by the local Parish council and
community (Hedges, 2002; Ashden Awards, 2010).
Fig. 2. Sources and Types of State Regulation in Dartmoor.
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environmental acts. In addition, as much of Dartmoor is common
land, there are acts relating to the use and registration of common
land (which includes the use of waterways). There are area specific
pieces of national legislation that relate to Dartmoor and which
regulate land and water use. There are also sources of local state
regulation, including the Devon County Council and district/
borough councils with their own byelaws. Particularly important is
the Dartmoor National Park Authority. The National Park Authority
is a special purpose local authority created under the Environment
Act 1995 and plays an important role in planning permissions. In
addition, it enforces its own byelaws (which includes prohibiting
inhibiting or diverting of the flow of watercourses and regulation of
commercial activities). In addition, there is also the Dartmoor
Commoners' Council which, under the Dartmoor Commons Act(1985), represents commoners and makes and enforces regulations
concerning the management of the commons within the national
park (see Fig. 2). While the Council regulations mainly relate to
livestock husbandry, they do contain a prohibition on damage to
‘the natural beauty of the commons’ that has the potential to affect
the production of renewable energy.
In terms of processes, in order to be granted permission to
construct and operate a micro hydro-electricity plant, an agent
has to ensure that they have rights of access to the river at the
point where they intend to build their plant. Secondly, the agent is
required to consult with organisations, such as the British
Hydropower Association, to ensure that the preliminary design
of the scheme is suitable and takes measures to reduce any
negative impacts on the environment, local communities and
other users of the same water source. This is followed by applying
Source  of Regulaon Typ es of Regula on 
State regul aon at  naonal leve l  El ect ricit y Act  1989 
Climate  Change  Act 200 8 
Plannin g Act  2008  
Energy Act  2013 
Salmon and  Freshwater  Fi sher ies Act  1975 
Water Industry  Act  1991  
Water  Resource s Ac t 199 1 
Flood and  Water  Manag ement  Act 20 10 
Water  Act  2014 
Wildlife and  Countryside  Act 198 1 
Natural  En vironm ent  and  Rura l Communi es  Act  2006  
Conservaon  of  Habit ats  and  Spec ies  Regulaons  20 10 
Enclosure Act  1857  
Commons Act  187 6 
Countryside  Act  196 8 
Countrysid e and  Ri ghts  of  Way Ac t 20 00 
Naonal Inf rastructu re Plannin g Act  2008 
Environment Act  199 5 
Dartmoo r Commons  Act  1985 
Naonal Park s and  Acc ess  to  th e Count ryside  Act,  1949 
Town & Country  Planning  Act  197 1 
Local Governm ent  Act  19 72 
Local Governm ent  Act  19 80 
Dartmoo r Commons  Act  1985 
Dartmoo r Naonal  Park  (D esignaon)  Variaon  Order  
1990 
Environment Act  199 5 
State regul aon at  local level   
Devon  County Council 
West Devon  Borough  Council 
Teignb ridge  District Council  South 
Hams Dist rict Council. 
Dartmoo r Naonal  Park  Autho rit y 
Dartmoo r Commoner s' Council 
County  Cou ncil and Borough/District  Counci l Byelaws 
Local Developme nt Pla n and  Plann ing  Gui de 
Byela ws in clud e th e regul aon of  th e obst rucon and 
diversion  of  wat er cours es and  comm ercial  acvity . 
Dartmoor  Commoners'  Counci l Regula ons  (wh ich 
includes th e obst rucon  of  leats  or watercou rses) 
Non-state  regulaon  by 
org anisaons 
Dartmoor Pre serva on Asso ciaon 
Policy 9.   Th e DPA  is  opposed  to th e disfiguraon  of  the 
moorland  landscap e by  television  masts , mobil e 
telephone mas ts and  wind  farms.  Small  scal e wind 
generators serving  a sin gle  farm  or  ham let  wil l be ju dged 
on th e mer it of  the  plann ing  applica on. 
Dartmoo r Fa rmer s Associaon 
Duchy of  Co rnwall 
South West  Water 
Dartmoo r Fa rmer s Associao n Produc on  Criteria  and 
Aspiraons (Farmers  shou ld aspire  to  develop  renew able 
localised energy  genera on and  shar ed disposal  of  wast e).
For land ow ned  by the Duchy  of  Corn wall, lease 
agreements can  prohibi t certain  acvity .  
Internal corporat e gov ernance  and  sustainability 
regulaons including  25- year  Water  Future  Vision . 
Social Norm s These  can be  at  the  naonal,  local , fa rmer,  indi vidual  level 
and enforce d by  gro ups,  sub-groups  or internall y.  So cial 
norms par cularly  releva nt are  th e app ropriate  us e of 
agricultural land  and no ons of  enviro nmenta l 
responsibility. 
Fig. 3. Hydro Electricity Generation in Dartmoor.
60 S. Larcom, T. van Gevelt / Environmental Science & Policy 72 (2017) 55–64for an abstraction or impoundment license and flood defence
consent from the Environment Agency, and for planning
permission from Dartmoor National Park Authority. Although
there is no specific requirement to do so, applicants are
encouraged to consult the local community, water users andtheir representative groups (e.g. the Canal and River Trust),
environmental groups (e.g. wildlife trust), the company respon-
sible for distributing electricity in the area, and local parishes to
obtain letters of support (Dartmoor National Park Authority,
2016).
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regulations that can impact micro hydro-electricity generation
in Dartmoor. Non-state organisations include the Dartmoor
Preservation Association, that has a number of ‘policies’ it aims
to enforce, including averting the disfigurement of the moorland
landscape (Policy 9); the Dartmoor Farmers Association that has
membership production criteria and aspirations, including that
farmers should aspire to develop renewable localised energy
generation (Aspiration 4); and the rules of private entities and
companies who may own land or operate infrastructure, such as
the Duchy of Cornwall and South West Water. Finally, there are also
likely to be various norms that regulate behaviour relevant to the
generation of hydro-electricity, enforced by internalisation, sub-
groups or more widely within Dartmoor. These may include
notions of what the land and water resources should be used for,
with some farmers or families for instance holding strong beliefs
that farmland should be used exclusively for farming in a certain
manner. For instance, Short and Dwyer (2012:5) highlight the ‘very
strong cultural attachment’ many upland farmers in England have
‘to their way of life and the traditions associated with hill farming’
and that a high degree of emotion can be involved.
Our regulatory mapping results in five important findings.
Firstly, mapping the entire regulatory framework of the nexus is a
formidable task. Secondly, the regulatory environment is spatially
contingent, as many regulations are localised. Thirdly, many
regulations are from non-state sources, and in the case of social
norms, are unwritten. Fourthly, it should also be apparent that
many of the sources of regulation and regulations themselves are
overlapping. In relation to the Dartmoor exercise, there are clearly
multiple sources and multiple regulations that concern the
obstruction/diversion of waterways and visual amenity. Deter-
mining the degree that the regulations complement or substitute
for each other is not straightforward and may be case specific.
Finally, it is unclear which regulations are enforced and which are
merely on the books. Regulations that are unenforced may be
merely ‘surface law’ (Twining, 2009) and there is a vast literature
highlighting the importance of enforcement activity on regulatory
compliance (Polinsky and Shavell, 2001).
3.2. The case of Huckworthy Mill
Permission for the 100kWp Huckworthy Mill micro hydro-
electric plant was granted conditionally in 2012 by the Dartmoor
National Park Authority and construction commenced in early
2013. The plant is currently operational and produces, on average,
enough electricity to power around 100 houses (CGP, 2016). The
agent behind Huckworthy Mill followed the standard application
procedure in Dartmoor National Park. This consisted of first
obtaining rights of access to the River Walkham. This was achieved
through the formalisation of rights of access to the intake, forebay
and powerhouse through a lease agreement including easements
for all construction areas located outside the boundary of the
leased land (e.g. for transmission cables). The agent contracted a
hydro power consultancy and a fishery impact assessment
consultancy to ensure that the preliminary design of the scheme
was suitable and took measures to reduce negative impacts on the
environment. This was followed by applications for an abstraction
licence and a fish pass approval from the Environment Agency,
flood defence consent from Devon County Council and planning
permission from the Dartmoor National Park Authority. Applica-
tions were accompanied by consultations with West Devon
Borough Council, Burrator Parish Council, Dartmoor National Park
Authority, Natural England, South West Water, and local commu-
nity members (Dartmoor National Park Authority, 2014).
Approval was granted by the Environment Agency for a water
abstraction licence and for construction of a fish pass, and fromDevon County Council for flood defence consent. The planning
permission application to Dartmoor National Park was considered
by the Dartmoor National Park Authority’s Development Manage-
ment Committee. The Committee, which meets monthly to make
decisions on planning applications, consists of 24 members. Five
members are appointed by Devon County Council, two by West
Devon Borough Council, two from Teignbridge District Council and
one from South Hams District Council. Four members are
appointed by parish councils to represent the interests of parish
councils in Dartmoor. The final five members are appointed to
represent the national interest by the Secretary of State. In making
their decision, the Committee decides on whether or not to grant
planning permission on the basis of how the impacts of
construction and operation of the micro hydro scheme affect
relevant policies from the Devon Structure Plan (CO), the Dartmoor
National Park Core Strategy (COR), and the Dartmoor National Park
Development Management Plan (DMD). Fig. 4 summarises the
policies found relevant by the Committee with reference to
granting planning permission for micro hydro-electricity genera-
tion at Huckworthy Mill (Dartmoor National Park Authority, 2012,
2014, 2016).
The Committee also takes into account the outcomes of
consultations. In this case, South West Water, the Environment
Agency and Nature England had no objections to the proposed
plant. Burrator parish council and two members of the community
supported the proposal and its potential to contribute to the
generation of renewable energy. Plasterdown Grouped parish
council, Dartmoor National Park Authority, the Dartmoor Society,
the Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE), the
Council for British Archaeology, as well as 69 community members
objected to the proposal due to historic, landscape and environ-
mental concerns. Historic concerns focused on the loss of historic
buildings, particularly the weir which dates back to the 16th
century. Landscape concerns centred on the negative visual impact
of the proposed fish pass on Dartmoor River. Environment
concerns centred on the negative impact the micro hydro-
electricity plant would have on salmon populations and concerns
regarding increased flooding risk. Notably, many consultations
objecting to the plant acknowledged the benefits of renewable
energy but argued that the amount of electricity generated would
not be sufficient to offset the negative impact to historic buildings,
the natural landscape and the environment. In April 2012, the
Committee refused planning permission for the construction due
to concerns over the fish pass. Specifically, the Committee decided
that the construction of the fish pass would be to the detriment of
the appearance and character of Dartmoor National Park and was
therefore contrary to policies CO2, COR1, COR3, COR4, DMD1 and
DMD6 (see Fig. 4). The Committee also judged that the proposal
would involve the destruction of a heritage asset (the weir) and
that this was contrary to policies CO2, CO8, COR1, COR3, COR4,
COR6, COR7, DMD1, DMD6 and DMD11 (Dartmoor National Park
Authority, 2012, 2014).
In response, a revised application was submitted that included
reports from a structural engineering consultancy, an archaeolog-
ical survey by historians, and a fishery impact assessment
consultancy. The report from the structural engineer found that
the historical weir was lacking in structural integrity and in
immediate need of repair (Bastone, 2012). The archaeological
survey found that, although the weir was first built in the 16th
century, there was evidence that the weir had been rebuilt in the
19th and 20th centuries using cement (Brown and Andrew, 2012).
The fishery impact assessment found that the design of the plant
and a change in water levels due to abstraction would have
minimal impact on salmon population (Kibel and Coe, 2011). Upon
receipt of this second application, the Committee moved to
conditionally grant planning permission for construction of the
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Fig. 4. Policies relevant to Huckworthy Mill Based on: Dartmoor National Park Authority (2014).
13 Given that the nature of interdependencies, the level of transaction costs and
processes are likely to differ across components of the nexus and geographies this
result is to be expected. This variation may be the result of specific resource
characteristics (e.g. the degree of subtractability and exclusion) and the
characteristics of resource users (e.g. preference heterogeneity, power relations,
social capital) (Paavola and Adger, 2005).
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light of the new findings concerning historic buildings and the
environmental impact, the benefit of renewable energy generation
provided justification to grant planning permission despite the
negative visual impact that it would cause (Dartmoor National Park
Authority, 2012, 2014).
Through our analysis of planning documents, we have shown
how the current regulatory framework operates with regards to a
tangible nexus issue: the establishment of a small micro hydro-
electricity plant on the River Walkham. Our analysis has shown
how a highly decentralised and fragmented regulatory framework
with different sources of authority and competing objectives has
effectively dealt with each component of the nexus and its
interactions through a process largely based on procedural justice.
4. Discussion
Our analysis has highlighted that even for one component of
one of the sectors of the nexus there are a multitude of regulations
from multiple sources, and that many of the regulations and their
sources are place and activity specific. We have also shown that
mapping the regulatory framework of the nexus, even for a small
area of England such as Dartmoor is a formidable task. By focusing
on the issue of micro hydro-electricity generation in Dartmoor, we
have shown that regardless of the complexity involved, policy-
makers and regulators already have the tools at their disposal to
account for the interdependencies and complexities of the nexus.
In particular, we have shown how a regulatory framework built
around the principles of procedural justice and that recognizes the
economic concepts of interdependencies and transaction costs has
the ability to generate outcomes that allocate resources in a
broadly efficient manner, and that enables the various trade-offs
among the sectors of the nexus to be considered.
From the case study of Huckworthy Mill (a concrete example of
the kind of water-energy-food nexus issues faced today), it was
shown that the existing highly decentralised and fragmented
regulatory framework, with multiple sources and forms of
regulation is able to accommodate each sector of the nexus and
their interactions, and produce a well-balanced regulatory
outcome. Indeed, due to the presence of transaction costs thedecentralized and fractionalised regulatory framework may
actually be optimal as there are likely to be many informational
and cost advantages that smaller scale regulators have, both in
terms of regulatory scale and nexus sectors. More localised
regulators can have much better information in terms of the
practical needs of those who they regulate and be able to enforce
the regulations much better than a centralised and distant
regulator. There may be distinct informational and cost advantages
for regulators specialising in different sectors of the nexus due to
cognitive limitations of individuals – who ultimately set and
enforce regulations (Wichelns, 2017).
We have shown that current regulatory practices can produce a
well-balanced outcome in terms of the nexus and that this balance
is largely driven by a process based on procedural justice that
allows preferences and values from a wide spectrum of stake-
holders to be taken into account. We have also shown that this
outcome is achieved despite the existence of different regulators,
at different scales, with different objectives, and with different
sources of authority. We consider this finding to be an important
contribution to the nexus literature, and one that suggests that
calls for a radical overhaul or greater centralisation or regulation on
the grounds of nexus analysis may be misplaced. This finding could
only feasibly be achieved by drilling down into one component of
the nexus in one specific part of one country, and therefore
highlights the benefits of the specificity of this study. However, it
must also be noted that our regulatory mapping exercise also
highlighted that many regulations and their sources are both place
and activity specific.13 While this limits the generalisability of our
findings in terms of well-balanced regulatory outcomes, it does not
diminish our most important result – the importance of process
when regulating the nexus. Nonetheless, it is hoped that our
method and results will spur similar exercises for other
components of the nexus and in other places to ascertain whether
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outcomes as we have discovered or require a radical overhaul as
some others have suggested. In terms of the existing literature,
Stein et al. (2014) also emphasise the use of existing arrangements
to govern the nexus, in the very different regulatory context of
Ethiopia. Our analysis is also consistent with Wichelns (2017), who
taking a historical approach, concludes that efforts aimed at
improving policy co-ordination along nexus lines is not always
possible or warranted.
Importantly, we do not wish to suggest that better regulation
cannot come about through nexus analysis. Quite the opposite: as
long as regulators account for transaction costs and procedural
justice practices, they can gain significant benefits from nexus
analysis that identifies and quantifies interdependencies that can
then be addressed by various regulators. Indeed, examples of nexus
analysis that have the potential to support regulatory decision
making can already be found. For instance, Daher and Mohtar
(2015) apply their Water-Energy-Food nexus tool 2.0 to a case
study of food security in Qatar and Welsh et al. (2014) apply the
Climate, Land, Energy and Water Strategies (CLEWs) modelling
approach to ethanol production in Mauritius. FORSEER, another
modelling tool, has been used to analyse the future supply and
demand of water resources in California where it has enabled
policymakers to better understand the competing uses of water at
different scales, as well as potential opportunities for improving
management of water, energy and food resources that would most
likely be overlooked in a sector-based approach (Curmi et al.,
2013). Importantly, if nexus analysis is to support local level
decision-making, where many important regulatory decisions are
known to be made, modellers will need to develop decision
support tools that can be easily scaled to this level. Promisingly,
some tools such as FORSEER allow for different spatial scales to be
considered. This raises the potential for such tools to be used to
enable local level regulators to make better informed decisions
based on all sectors of the nexus.
If such decision support tools could be provided cost-
effectively, they could even be incorporated into the local planning
process. However, rather than driving decisions by themselves,
such tools should be used to enable informed local level decision-
making within a process based upon procedural justice. This view
is consistent with Howarth and Monasterolo (2016) who argue
that a transdisciplinary approach with active engagement of
stakeholders from the water, energy and food sectors would
improve the exchange of information and improve the decision-
making process. Such stakeholder engagement allows the ex-
change of information and the expression of preferences and
values that can lead to more shared decision-making and action. At
the same time, the benefits of increased stakeholder participation
and dialogue must be balanced against the well-documented
transaction costs involved in moving beyond discipline-specific
knowledge (Harris and Lyon, 2014), which could reduce the ability
to undertake productive regulatory activities of pressing nexus
issues.
5. Conclusion
Using the case study of micro hydro-electricity generation on
farmland in Dartmoor National Park in England as a vehicle, we
have shown how a regulatory framework built around the
principle of procedural justice and that recognises the economic
concepts of interdependence and transaction costs has the ability
to generate efficient outcomes and consider trade-offs among the
sectors of the nexus. Our findings suggest that while regulators
have much to learn from nexus analysis, the nexus will not
necessarily require a radical overhaul of regulatory frameworks as
has been suggested by some in the literature. Instead, stakeholdersengaged in regulating the nexus can learn from the insights of the
rich pre-existing literature on regulation. In particular, an
awareness of the interactions between state and non-state
regulation, the economic concepts of interdependencies and
transaction costs, and a recognition that regulation of the nexus
is a process involving decisions of procedural and distributive
justice can provide a more nuanced approach to understanding the
contributions of current nexus analysis and provide meaningful
advice to regulators and policymakers. Finally, due to the existence
of transaction costs, a centralized regulatory framework for the
nexus may not actually be appropriate, even if it were possible.
Instead, an increase in transaction costs may be generated from a
loss of informational advantages from localized regulators who
specialize in individual components (or sub-components) of the
nexus suggesting that the current ‘siloed’ approach may have both
theoretical and practical benefits.
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